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SYMPOSIUM 
FOREWORD:UNENUMERATED 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND 
THE RULE OF LAW 
RANDY E. BARNETI* 
The great and chief end ... of Mens uniting into Common-
wealths, and putting themselves under Government, is the 
Preservation of their Property. To which in the state of Nature 
there are many things wanting. 
First, There wants an establish'd, setded, known Law, re-
ceived and allowed by common consent to be the standard 
of Right and Wrong, and the common measure to decide all 
Controversies between them. For though the Law of Nature 
be plain and intelligible to all rational Creatures, yet Men, 
being biassed by their Interest, as well as ignorant for want 
of study of it, are apt not to allow of it as a Law binding to 
them in the application of it to their particular Cases. 1 
INTRODUCTION: THE RULE OF LAw REVIVAL 
The rule of law has long been one of the mainstays of liberal 
thought. John Locke cited its absence-not the absence of 
rights, which Locke thought existed in the state of nature-as 
the first reason for forming a government.2 Essentially, the rule 
of law says that the requirements of justice must take a form 
such that persons can know what justice requires of them 
b~fore they act and can detect abuses by those charged with law 
enforcement. If the formal and procedural requirements of the 
rule of law are adhered to, those "good" persons who seek to 
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1. J. LoCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 368-69 (P. l..aslett 2d ed. 1967) (3d ed. 
1698) (emphasis in original). 
2. According to Locke, the other two shortcomings of the state of nature are the 
absence of impartial judges and the dangers faced by victims seeking to enforce their 
own rights when confronted by the violent resistance of the offender. See id. at 369-70. 
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act properly can know what proper actions are. With this 
knowledge they can order their actions with those of others, 
thereby achieving a peaceful society with a minimum of con-
flict. The order of actions provided by adherence to the rule of 
law not only avoids conflict, it permits individuals and associa-
tions to plan for the future and to take action in reliance on a 
predictable legal regime. 
Moreover, the formal and procedural standards provided by 
the rule of law address two problems inherent to the adminis-
tration of justice: the problems of enforcement error and en-
forcement abuse. Some of these standards-such as rules 
allocating burdens of proof-help avoid enforcement errors. 
Others-such as the requirement of generality or equal treat-
ment-help observers of a system ofjustice to detect "bad" ac-
tions by persons vested with the responsibility for correcting 
injustice. The ability to detect enforcement abuse is a prerequi-
site for taking action against such persons. 8 
All this was challenged by the legal realists in the 1920s and 
1930s, a period when the stable "order of actions" governed by 
the rule oflaw posed obstacles to the sort of radical progressiv-
ist reforms that were thought to be needed to combat the 
abuses of "unfettered" capitalism and eventually the Great De-
pression. The legal realists charged that adhering to the rule of 
law resulted in a "mechanical jurisprudence" -now widely 
called "formalism." According to this criticism, formal rules 
that are thought to be necessary for establishing a rule of law 
cannot be relied upon to reach just results. From the perspec-
tive of justice, rules are either redundant or pernicious. They 
are redundant when they reach the same result as substantive 
justice requires; they are pernicious when they yield a different 
result. The very generality of rules means that they often do 
injustice. As Jerome Frank contended: 
Once trapped by the belief that the announced rules are the 
paramount thing in the law, and that uniformity and cer-
tainty are of major importance, and are to be procured by 
uniformity and certainty in the phrasing of rules, a judge is 
likely to be affected, in determining what is fair to the parties 
in the unique situation before him, by consideration of the 
possible, yet scarcely imaginable, bad effect of a just opinion 
in the instant case on possible unlike cases which may later 
3. See Barnett, Foreword: Can justice and the Rule of Law Be Reconciled7, 11 HARV.J.L. & 
PuB. PoL'Y 597, 602-09, 619-21 (1988). 
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be brought into court. He then refuses to do justice in the 
case on trial because he fears that "hard cases make bad 
laws." And thus arises what may apdy be called "itUustice 
according to law." 
Such injustice is particularly tragic because it is based on a 
hope doomed to futility, a hope of controlling the future ... . 
For it is the nature of the future that it never arrives .... 4 
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Moreover, some realists argued that rules of law are really 
indeterminate-that is, they are subject to unchecked manipu-
lation and therefore fail to constrain judges and other legal 
decisionmak.ers. Furthermore, because people are widely igno-
rant oflegal rules, they do not really rely on such rules to order 
their future. For all these reasons, realists believed that the 
objectives of the rule oflaw cannot be achieved by devising and 
adhering to formal rules; other means of predicting legal sanc-
tions are required. 
In place of the rule oflaw, some of the realists, like Jerome 
Frank, urged a more "particularist" mode of justice in which 
decisions are reached without much effort at identifying rules. 
According to this method, after all the relevant facts are devel-
oped, all these facts are reported together with the outcomes of 
cases so that future decisionmak.ers can predict how their fac-
tual circumstances might be decided. Equity, not the common 
law, was to be the model: 
The judge, at his best, is an arbitrator, a "sound man" who 
strives to do justice to the parties by exercising a wise discre-
tion with reference to the peculiar circumstances of the case. 
He does not merely "find" or invent some generalized rule 
which he "applies" to the facts presented to him. He does 
"equity" in the sense in which Aristotle-when thinking 
most clearly-described it.5 
Other realists, such as Karl Llewellyn, urged that decisions be 
reached by taking into account other bodies of knowledge, such 
as sociology or economics. 6 
Although the realists succeeded in undermining confidence 
in the efficacy of rules, they never succeeded in finding an ade-
quate substitute for the formal requirements of the rule oflaw. 
4. j. FRANK, LAw AND THE MoDERN MIND 165-66 (1963). 
5. /d. at 168 (emphasis in original). 
6. See, e.g., Uewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARv. 
L. REv. 1222 (1931). In Ibis respect, while Ihe critical legal studies movement has in-
herited Ihe realist's particularism and antiformalism, Ihe law and economics movement 
can be viewed as an outgrowih of Ibis oiher more empirical strain of legal realism. 
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Althoughjerome Frank assured us that "it is the nature of the 
future that it never arises,"7 we are now living in the post-real-
ist world in which the absence of rules often makes the out-
come of lawsuits in many areas of law very difficult to predict. 8 
In the 1960s, three influential objections to this realist 
revolution appeared. In The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart chal-
lenged the radical indeterminacy thesis of the realists. Accord-
ing to Hart, a common-law system of judge-made rules was as 
good a source of comparatively determinate legal rules as any 
system of legislation: 
Any honest description of the use of precedent in English 
law must allow a place for the following pairs of contrasting 
facts. First, there is no single method of determining the rule 
for which a given authoritative precedent is an authority. 
Notwithstanding this, in the vast majority of decided cases 
there is very litde doubt. The head-note is usually correct 
enough. Secondly, there is no authoritative or uniquely cor-
rect formulation of any rule to be extracted from cases. On 
the other hand, there is often very general agreement, when 
the bearing of a precedent on a later case is in issue, that a 
given formulation is adequate. Thirdly, whatever authorita-
tive status a rule extracted from precedent may have, it is 
compatible with the exercise by courts which are bound by it 
of ... creative or legislative activity .... Notwithstanding 
[this,] ... the result of the English system of precedent has 
been to produce, by its use, a body of rules of which a vast 
number, of both major and minor importance, are as deter-
minate as any statutory rule.9 
In The judicial Decision, Richard Wasserstrom challenged the 
wisdom of the realists' particularist view of justice. He argued 
that if judges did not base their decisions on general rules, such 
decisions would be based only on intuitions. An exclusive reli-
ance on intuitions, however, provides an inadequate check on 
the exercise of judicial partiality. Intuitions of particular just 
decisions 
are essentially private affairs. They are difficult to obtain; 
they are even harder to repeat and thereby verify. The evi-
dence for the correctness of the conclusion reached and ad-
vanced must consist in the testimony of the "intuitor" that 
he has had the proper intuition. Unless one has had a com-
parable intuition, the word of the "intuitor" must be taken 
7. J. FRANK, supra note 4, at 166. 
8. SeeP. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQ.UENCES (1988). 
9. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 131-32 (1961) (emphasis in original). 
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both for the fact that he has had the vision and for the fact 
that he has interpreted its commands faithfully. The course 
of human history has revealed the desirability of imposing 
far more stringent requirements than this in other areas of 
consequence; it seems strange, therefore, to argue that an 
institution so vital as the legal system ought to settle for so 
little.10 
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Finally, a crucial development occurred when Ronald Dwor-
kin, in "The Model of Rules,"11 criticized the realists' (and 
Hart's) exclusive identification of law with rules in favor of a 
more realistic view of law as a mixture of both rules and gen-
eral principles. Dworkin accepted Hart's view that rules could 
effectively guide (and thereby order) human conduct, but chal-
lenged Hart's thesis that when the guidance provided by legal 
rules is exhausted, we are left with nothing but discretion un-
guided by general and predictable standards. "[W]hen lawyers 
reason or dispute about legal rights and obligations, particu-
larly in those hard cases when our problems with these con-
cepts seem most acute," Dworkin argued, "they make use of 
standards that do not function as rules, but operate differently 
as principles, policies, and other sorts of standards." 12 When 
operating in the "open texture" of rules, Dworkin insisted that 
lawyers could still reach determinate "right answers" by taking 
into account background principles: 
Once we identify legal principles as separate sorts of stan-
dards, different from legal rules, we are suddenly aware of 
them all around us. Law teachers teach them, lawbooks cite 
them, legal historians celebrate them. But they seem most 
energetically at work, carrying most weight, in difficult law-
suits .... [In such cases] principles play an essential part in 
arguments supporting judgments about particular legal 
rights and obligations. Mter the case is decided, we may say 
that the case stands for a particular rule. . . . But the rule 
does not exist before the case is decided; the court cites prin-
ciples as its justification for adopting and applying a new 
rule .... 
An analysis of the concept of legal obligation must there-
fore account for the important role of principles in reaching 
10. R. WASSERSTROM, THE jUDICIAL DECISION: TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL jUSTIFI-
CATION 95-96 (1961). 
11. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14 (1967). 
12. /d. at 22. In his later writings, Dworkin distinguishes between principles and pol-
icies and eschews the judicial pursuit of the latter. See R. DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 244 
(1986) (':Judges must make their common-Jaw decisions on grounds of principle, not 
policy."). 
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particular decisions of law.13 
This Symposium on "Rules and the Rule of Law" can be 
seen as the culmination of the emerging post-realist consensus 
concerning the rule of law. According to this consensus, the 
conception of the rule of law that, together with the conception 
of justice, is so important to liberalism should not be identified 
exclusively with legal rules. Though legal rules are surely im-
portant, other legal precepts, such as general principles, are 
al~o needed to achieve a rule of law and to avoid a "rule of 
men." The writings of Frederick Schauer that are the focus of 
this Symposium have done much to develop this insight, at a 
time when the critical legal studies movement was reacting to 
the revival of the rule of law with a renewed adherence to the 
radical indeterminacy thesis of the realists. 14 
In the balance of this Foreword, I wish to use this refined 
vision of the rule of law to address a controversy in constitu-
tional theory: the protection of unenumerated constitutional 
rights. As I explain, constitutional theorists who resist recog-
nizing and protecting unenumerated rights on the ground that 
the judicial protection of these rights violates the rule of law 
fail to grasp the new, refined conception of the rule of law 
based on both rules and principles. In particular, they fail to 
recognize the importance of presumptions-a type oflegal pre-
cept also stressed by Fred Schauer15-in reconciling the rule of 
law with the pursuit of justice. 
THE RULE OF LAw AND THE PROBLEM OF 
UNENUMERATED RIGHTS 
The Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights 
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by 
the people." 16 In a like vein, the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
13. Dworkin, supra note 11, at 29. 
14. Compare Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399 (1985) with Tushnet, Follow-
ing the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of lnterpretivism and Neutral Prindples, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
781 (1983). 
15. See Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 645, 674-77 
(1991). 
16. U.S. CoNST. amend. IX. 
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immunities of citizens of the United States .... " 17 The mean-
ings ofboth of these provisions are highly controverted. Every-
one agrees that each proVision refers to rights that are not 
enumerated in the text of the Constitution. The controversy 
instead surrounds (a) the source and content of these rights, 
and (b) their judicial enforceability. 18 I will not rehearse these 
controversies in this Foreword. Instead, I will consider whether 
a commitment to the formal values represented by the rule of 
law is somehow incompatable with judges protecting the 
unenumerated rights encompassed by these provisions. 
The very concept of unenumerated rights presents obvious rule 
of law problems. The rule of law dictates that the requirements 
of justice take an articulate and understandable form. Quite ob-
viously, the unenumerated rights referred to by the Ninth and 
Fourteenth Amendments have no form at all-they are unwrit-
ten. Without some authoritative way to give them a sufficiently 
determinate content, judicial enforcement of these rights 
would seem to violate the rule of law. This becomes especially 
important when the separation of powers is considered. Ac-
cording to the theory of separation of powers, courts are only 
authorized to enforce the Constitution and the rights it pro-
tects, not to legislate. When faced with textual provisions as 
completely open-ended as these, any judicial interpretation of 
unenumerated rights hardly seems an interpretation at all, for 
there is simply nothing to interpret. Enforcing unenumerated 
rights in the absence of a text would seem instead to be a 
purely legislative act. To put the problem in H.L.A. Hart's 
terms, every case or controversy arising under the Ninth 
Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause lies in the 
"open texture" 19 of these provisions; therefore, neither provi-
sion facilitates rule-bound decisions. When confronted with a 
case lying within the open texture of language, the only option 
17. U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV,§ I. 
18. For the debate on the Ninth Amendment, see THE RIGHI'S RETAINED BY THE PEo-
PLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (R. Barnett ed. 1989) (here-
inafter R. BARNE'IT]; and Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENT L. 
REv. 37 (1988). For a concise summary of the Ninth Amendment debate, see Alexan-
der, Book Review, 7 CoNST. CoMMENTARY 396 (1990). For the debate on the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause, compare R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY jUDICIARY: THE TRANSFOR-
MATION oF THE FouRTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977) with M. CuRTIS, No STATE SHALL 
ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHI'S (1986). 
19. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 120-32. 
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is to exercise judicial discretion, and this sort of discretion con-
flicts with the rule oflaw. 
The apparent conflict between these clauses and the rule of 
law has most likely been one reason for their judicial neglect 
ever since their enactment. Recently, however, this rule of law 
difficulty with unenumerated rights has received special atten-
tion in the writings of Robert Bork. As Bork has explained: 
In a constitutional democracy the moral content of law must 
be given by the morality of the framer or the legislator, 
never by the morality of the judge. The sole task of the lat-
ter-and it is a task quite large enough for anyone's wisdom, 
skill, and virtue-is to translate the framer's or the legisla-
tor's morality into a rule to govern unforseen circumstances. 
That abstinence from giving his own desires free play, that 
continuing and self-conscious renunciation of power, that is 
the morality of the jurist. 20 
Adhering to this philosophy, says Bork, is "essential if courts 
are to govern according to the rule of law rather than whims of 
politics and personal preference."21 To illustrate this, Bork of-
fers an analogy: 
[S]uppose that the United States, like the United Kingdom, 
had no written constitution, and, therefore, no law to apply 
to strike down acts of the legislature. The U.S. judge, like the 
U.K. judge, could never properly invalidate a statute or an 
official action as unconstitutional. The very concept of un-
constitutionality would be meaningless. The absence of a 
constitutional provision means the absence of a power of ju-
dicial review. But when a U.S. judge is given a set of consti-
tutional provisions, then, as to anything not covered by 
those provisions, he is in the same position as the U.K. 
judge. He has no law to apply and is, quite properly, powerless. 
In the absence of law, a judge is a functionary without a 
function. 22 
As Bork repeatedly argues, "[d]emocratic choice must be ac-
cepted by the judge where the Constitution is silent."28 
For one who takes this view of the judiciary and the rule of 
law, the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause pose a dilemma. On the one hand, the Constitution is 
not exactly silent; it certainly includes these passages. On the 
20. R. BORK, THE TEMPI1NG OF AMERICA: THE PoLmCAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw 318 
(1990). 
21. /d. 
22. /d. at 147 (emphasis added). 
23. Id. at 150. 
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other hand, because these passages are so open-textured, their 
framers failed to provide judges with "their" morality; thus, 
these provisions appear to provide "no law" to the judge. In 
the absence of such authoritative guidance, judges would be 
free to allow their own desires free rein. The Ninth Amend-
ment (and the Privileges or Immunities Clause) would thus 
provide "a bottomless well in which the judiciary can dip for 
the formation of undreamed of 'rights' in their limitless discre-
tion, a possibility that the Founders would have rejected out of 
hand."24 Consequently, unless we can somehow discover the 
framers' original intent-that is, what specific rights they had in 
mind when drafting these provisions-the rule of law seems to 
require that judges ignore these enacted passages of the 
Constitution. 
This is precisely Bork's conclusion. In his Senate confirma-
tion hearings, Bork was asked about the Ninth Amendment and 
gave the following, now famous, reply: 
I do not think that you can use the ninth amendment unless 
you know something of what it means. For example, if you 
had an amendment that says "Congress shall make no" and 
then there is an ink blot and you cannot read the rest of it 
and that is the only copy you have, I do not think the court 
can make up what might be under the ink blot. 25 
In his book, The Tempting of America, Bork shifts this analogy to 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause: 
The judge who cannot make out the meaning of a provision 
is in exactly the same circumstance as judge who has no Con-
stitution to work with. There being nothing to work with, the 
judge should refrain from working. A provision whose 
meaning cannot be ascertained is precisely like a provision 
that is written in Sanskrit or is obliterated past deciphering 
by an ink blot. No judge is entitled to interpret an ink blot on 
the grounds that there must be something under it. So it has 
been with the clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibit-
ing any state from denying citizens the privileges and immu-
nities of citizens of the United States. The clause has been a 
mystery since its adoption and in consequence has, quite 
properly, remained a dead letter.26 
24. Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CoRNELL L. REv. 1, 2 (1980). 
25. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, lOOth Gong., 1st Sess. 249 (1987) 
[hereinafter Nomination Hearings] (testimony of Robert Bork). 
26. R. BoRK, supra note 20, at 166 (emphasis added). 
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In this manner, Bork uses the rule of law to justify ignoring the 
unenumerated rights that are the subject of these two textual 
provisions. 
Notice that Bork equates a judge intepreting a passage with 
no clear meaning with a judge having no constitution (like the 
U.K. judge described above). Where the text of the Constitu-
tion is insufficiently rule-like, Bork concludes that there is sim-
ply no law to apply, and consequently the Constitution is 
deemed to be "silent," notwithstanding what it says. As Bork 
concludes: "If the meaning of the Constitution is unknowable, 
if, so far as we can tell, it is written in undecipherable hiero-
·glyphics ... judges must stand aside and let democratic majori-
ties rule, because there is no law superior to theirs."27 
THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTI AND THE RULE OF LAW 
The post-realist rule of law provides a way to escape the co-
nundrum of ignoring those parts of the Constitution that fail to 
meet the criterion of ruleness. The rule of law is not a commit-
ment to rules simpliciter; it is not the law of rules, though some 
talk as though it is. 28 It is a commitment to a particular set of 
values-in particular, the value of enabling persons to discern 
the requirements of justice in advance of action (and in advance 
of subsequent litigation). Individuals and associations must 
know what justice requires before acting, if they are to coordi-
nate their actions with those of others. Moreover, only by 
somehow discerning the requirements of justice apart from the 
outcome of a lawsuit can we detect the existence of partiality in 
judicial decisionmaking that contributes to the problem of en-
forcement abuse. 
Given this function of the rule of law, we can see that its in-
formational requirements can be satisfied by means other than 
general rules-for instance, by general principles. Fred 
Schauer's emphasis on the use of ')ustificatory presumptions" 
in legal reasoning is particularly valuable in this regard: 
[A] justificatory presumption ... in constitutional law, oper-
ates in a decisionmaking framework in which reasons vary in 
27. Id. at 167. 
28. See, e.g., Scalia, The Rule of lAw as a lAw of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989). 
While justice Scalia's choice of titles reflects this view of the rule oflaw, throughout his 
article he repeatedly refers not only to rules, but also to "general" principles, "gov-
erning" principles, "finn, clear" principles, or "precise, principled content," as op· 
posed to rules. 
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strength. Even absent epistemic uncertainty, there may be 
reasons for taking some action that are simply stronger or 
more pressing than others. This loose observation, strong 
enough for present purposes, explains the difference be-
tween a reason that is compelling and one that is simply ra-
tional, between a justification that is reasonable and one that 
is important. The constitutional import of all these distinc-
tions is that, time and again, reasons that are sufficient for 
some purposes are insufficient for others. For instance, the 
existence of a quite good reason for restricting speech or 
taking race into account may still turn out to be insufficient 
because of the overwhelming justificatory burden that such a 
reason must meet.29 
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Let us now return to the basic problem posed by unenumer-
ated rights to see how the device of justificatory presumptions 
can be of assistance. 
The problem posed by unenumerated rights for the rule of 
law is that they are unenumerated. For this reason, the text 
does not provide judges with specific guidance to inform their 
decisions so that they are both predictable and impartial. One 
alternative to ignoring such clauses is to determine the framers' 
original intentions with respect to specific unenumerated 
rights.30 When pressed on the matter of judicial protection of 
unenumerated rights during his confirmation hearings, Bork 
replied, "Senator, if anybody shows me historical evidence 
about what ... [the framers] meant, I would be delighted to do 
it. I simply do not know."31 Assuming that the original intent of 
the framers with respect to specific rights can be determined, 
then, the rule oflaw problem created by the Ninth Amendment 
and the Privileges or Immunities Clause can be solved. These 
provisions should be taken to refer to the specific rights that 
the framers or ratifiers intended them to include.32 
29. Schauer, supra note 15, at 675. 
30. See Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 30-32 (1988) 
(describing the "originalist method" for determining unenumerated rights). This inter-
pretive approach is distinct from one that seeks the original intention as to whether 
unenumerated rights-whose content is ascertained, perhaps, by some other interpre-
tive method-should be protected. For a recent effort to enumerate the rights that the 
framers believed to be natural, see Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitu· 
tional1, 100 YALE LJ. 1073, 1074-81 (1991). 
31. Nomination Hearings, supra note 25, at 249. 
32. Cf. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Afijudication: Three Objec-
tions and Responses, 81 Nw. U.L. REv. 226, 264 (1988) (citations omitted): 
The existence of broad terms in the Constitution does seem to be good evi-
dence of an abstract original intention or one which directs us to values 
outside the Constitution. But it is mere evidence. It must be reconciled with 
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The strength of using the originalist method to determine 
unenumerated rights is that it would extend enforcement to 
specific rights that the framers had in mind but did not enumer-
ate. The weakness is that it would only enforce such specific 
rights and, thus, would fail to address the serious difficulty that 
motivated the framers to enact the passages in question in the 
first place. The problem is that a complete enumeration of such 
rights is simply impossible. As James Wilson noted: 
[T]here are very few who understand the whole of these 
rights. All the political writers, from Grotius and Puffendorf 
down to Vattel, have treated on this subject; but in no one of 
those books, nor in the aggregate of them all, can you find a 
complete enumeration of rights appertaining to the people 
as men and as citizens .... 
. . . Enumerate all the rights of men! I am sure, sir, that no 
gendeman in the late Convention would have attempted 
such a thing. 88 
Because Wilson was an ardent natural-rights theorist, 84 we 
know that his remarks do not reflect a modern rights-skepti-
cism based on the inherently contestable character of natural 
rights claims. But given his commitment to natural rights, what 
possible conception of "the rights appertaining to the people 
as men and as citizens" could account for the fact that they are 
unenumerable? · 
The puzzle is resolved by viewing rights not as welfare rights 
entitling persons to claim a specified portion of the resources 
of others, but as liberty rights entitling persons to the freedom to 
use what is theirs as they choose.85 Liberty rights define a 
boundary within which individuals and associations are free to 
do as they wish. Because the ways by which this liberty can be 
exercised are unlimited, it is impossible to enumerate all the 
specific rights that people possess. A complete list would in-
contrary evidence, including the commitment to a government limited by pre-
existing law. The constitution-makers may have used broad language to ex-
press narrow, concrete intentions. What appears to us to be general terms 
may, in fact, have been used as specific terms of art, or they may just have 
been inapt words chosen carelessly. 
33. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CoNSTITIITION 454 (J. Elliot reprinted. 1987) (2d ed. 1836) (remarks of james 
Wilson). 
34. Wilson lectured extensively on the content of natural rights while a law profes-
sor. See Wilson, OJ the Natural Rights of Individuals, in 2 THE WoRKS OF jAMES WILSON 
296 (J.D. Andrews ed. 1896). 
35. See L. LOMASKY, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND THE MORAL COMMUNITY 84 (1987) (distin-
guishing between welfare rights and liberty rights). 
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elude the right to type on a computer, to sip a Diet Coke, to 
scratch one's nose, and so forth. 
To see this conception of rights in operation, consider the 
following exchange that occurred in the first United States 
House of Representatives during the debate over the language 
proposed by the House Select Committee charged with draft-
ing the Bill of Rights for what eventually would become the 
First Amendment. Representative Theodore Sedgwick criti-
cized the committee's inclusion of the right of assembly on the 
grounds that "it is a self-evident, unalienable right which the 
people possess; it is certainly a thing that never would be called 
into question; it is derogatory to the dignity of the House to 
descend to such minutiae .... "36 Representative Egbert Ben-
son replied: "The committee who framed this report pro-
ceeded on the principle that these rights belonged to the 
people; they conceived them to be inherent; and all that they 
meant to proVide against was their being infringed by the Gov-
ernment. " 37 Sedgwick then responded that 
if the committee were governed by that general principle, 
they might have gone into a very lengthy enumeration of 
rights; they might have declared that a man should have a 
right to wear his hat if he pleased; that he might get up when 
he pleased, and go to bed when he thought proper.· ... 88 
Sedgwick's point was not that these rights are unimportant. 
Indeed, he equated the inherent right to wear a hat with the 
"self-evident, unalienable right" of assembly.89 Rather, 
36. 1 THE DEBATES AND PRoCEEDINGS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 731 
(Gales ed. 1834) [hereinafter ANNALS OF CoNG.] (statement of Rep. Sedgwick). 
37. Id. at 731-32 (statement of Rep. Benson). "Inherent rights" was commonly used 
synonymously with natural rights. 
38. I d. at 732 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick). 
39. Even if Sedgwick believed both the right ofassemb1y and the right to wear one's 
hat to be unimportant, others in Congress did not share his view. Representative john 
Page's reply to Sedgwick's example also reveals that the importance of what appear to 
be trifling rights depends crucially upon the context, and cannot always be anticipated: 
[L]et me observe to him that such rights have been opposed, and a man has 
been obliged to pull off his hat when he appeared before the face of authority; 
people have also been prevented from assembling together on their lawful 
occasions, therefore it is well to guard against such stretches of authority, by 
inserting the privilege in the declaration of rights. 
Id. at 732 (statement of Rep. Page). Of course, the right to wear a hat did not make it 
into the Bill of Rights. Should the government require head-baring in the presence of 
authority, the justificatory "presumption ofliberty" discussed below would require that 
this infringement on the liberty of the people be justified as a legit~mate exercise of 
governmental power, notwithstanding that the Constitution is "silent" with respect to 
hats. See infra notes 49-84 and accompanying text. 
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Sedgwick's point was that the Constitution should not be clut-
tered with a potentially endless list of rights that "would never 
be called in[to] question"40 and were not "intended to be in-
fringed."41 Sedgwick's argument implicitly assumes that the 
"self-evident, unalienable," and inherent liberty rights retained 
by the people are unenumerable because the human imagina-
tion is limitless. In light of this difficulty, james Wilson and 
others argued that it would be dangerous to list just some 
rights, because others would necessarily be excluded and 
thereby put in jeopardy of being ceded to government: 
In all societies, there are many powers and rights, which can-
not be particularly enumerated. A bill of rights annexed to a 
constitution is an enu111eration of the powers reserved. If we 
attempt an enumeration, everything that is not enumerated 
is presumed to be given. The consequence is, that an imper-
fect enumeration would throw all implied power into the 
scale of government; and the rights of the people would be 
rendered incomplete.42 
Jame~ Madison's solution to this serious problem was the 
Ninth Amendment. As he explained when introducing his pro-
posed constitutional amendments to the House: 
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by 
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it 
would disparage those rights which were not placed in that 
enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those 
rights which were not singled out, were intended to be as-
signed into the hands of the General Government, and were 
consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible ar-
gum~nts I have ever heard urged against the admission of a 
bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be 
guarded against. I have attempted it, as gentleman may see 
by turning to ... [the precursor of the Ninth Amendment].48 
Ironically, it is Robert Bork's interpretation of the Constitution 
sans Ninth Amendment that fulfills Madison's greatest fears 
concerning the Bill of Rights. For Bork contends that "[t]he 
elected legislator or executive may act where not forbidden; his 
40. /d. at 731 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick). 
41. /d. at 732 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick). 
42. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTI11JTION 388 
(M. Jensen ed. 1976) (statement of James Wilson to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Con-
vention, Nov. 28, 1787). For a different interpretation of Wilson's statement, see McAf-
fee, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1215, 1249-59 (1990). For a brief discussion of McAffee's 
interpretation of the Ninth Amendment, see infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text. 
43. I ANNALS OF CoNG., supra note 36, at 439 (statement of Rep. Madison). 
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delegation of power from the people through an election is his 
authority. " 44 
There still remains the problem of protecting these 
unenumerated and unenumerable liberty rights in a manner 
that is consistent with the rule oflaw. Other than the originalist 
method, how can this be done? Bork presumes the power of 
legislatures to act unless rightfully restrained by the Constitu-
tion, but by ignoring the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause, he picks up in the middle of a story that 
begins with the rights of the people. This is not surprising in 
light of his view that "the ratifiers' creation of one set of rights 
is simultaneously a failure or refusal to create more. There is 
no basis for extrapolating from the rights they did create to 
produce rights they did not."45 
Of course, although the framers undoubtedly thought bills of 
rights consisted of an amalgam of different sorts of rights, they 
certainly did not believe that they were "creating" the rights 
"retained by the people." The Constitution presupposes natural 
rights that preexisted its enactment.46 As Madison stated: 
"Trial by jury cannot be considered as a natural right, but a 
right resulting from a social compact which regulates the action 
of the community, but is as essential to secure the liberty of the 
people as any one of the pre-existent rights of nature."47 Repre-
sentative Roger Sherman, who served with Madison on the 
House Select Committee to draft the Bill of Rights, reaffirmed 
this basic assumption in the second article of his proposed 
versxon: 
The people have certain natural rights which are retained by 
them when they enter into Society, Such are the rights of 
Conscience in matters of religion; of acquiring property and 
of pursuing happiness & Safety; of Speaking, writing and 
44. R. BoRK, supra note 20, at 150 (emphasis added). The perversity of this claim for 
legislative and executive power is manifest when one considers the Tenth Amend-
ment's dictate that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people." U.S. CoNST. amend. X. According to the Tenth Amendment, the delegation 
of legislative and executive powers is not "through an election," as Bark asserts, but 
"by the Constitution." 
45. R. BoRK, supra note 20, at 198. 
46. See Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. 
L. REv. 149, 152-53 (1928); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in 
American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843 (1978); Sherry, The Founders' Un-
written Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127, 1166, 1177 (1987). 
47. 1 ANNALS OF CoNG., supra note 36, at 437 (emphasis added). 
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publishing their Sentiments with decency and freedom; of 
peaceably assembling to consult their common good, and of 
applying to Government by petition or remonstrance for re-
dress of grievances. Of these rights therefore they Shall not 
be deprived by the Government of the united States.48 
These natural or inherent rights protect the people's liberty 
to act as they see fit unless justly restrained by the government. 
Protecting these rights does not require specifying every in-
stance of protected liberty in advance. Instead, we may adopt a 
justificatory presumption of liberty that puts the burden on govern-
ment to show that any interference with the exercise of the 
rights retained by the people is justified. In contrast, courts to-
day employ a "presumption of constitutionality" that can be 
rebutted by the citizen identifying a "fundamental" right that 
has been infringed.49 With the exception of the right to privacy, 
in recent years only enumerated rights have been deemed to be 
fundamental. Certainly, no general right to liberty has been so 
characterized. 
Of course, liberty does not mean license to do whatever one 
wishes.50 justice, which is to say rights, defines the boundaries 
within which one may do as one wishes. One cannot permissi-
48. Sherman, Roger Shennan :S Draft of the Bill of Rights, reprinted in R. BARNE'IT, supra 
note 18, at 351 (emphasis added). This recently discovered draft, and Madison's use of 
the Ninth Amendment in his argument against the constitutionality of a national bank, 
see infra notes 71-84 and accompanying text, do much to undercut Russell Caplan's 
thesis that the rights "retained by the people" mentioned in the Ninth Amendment 
refer exclusively to state constitutional rights (that can be altered by a state's amendment 
process) or to statutory and common-law rights (that can be altered by simple state 
legislation), and not also to natural or inherent rights. See Caplan, The History and Mean-
ing of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. REv. 223, 227-28 (1983). Having shifted his ink-
blot analogy to the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Bork now tepidly endorses 
Caplan's theory of the Ninth Amendment. SeeR. BoRK, supra note 20, at 184-85. For a 
provocative discussion of how state constitutional rights can serve as one source of 
rights protected by the Ninth Amendment, see Massey, The Anti-Federalist Ninth Amend-
ment and Its Implications for State Constitutional Law, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 1229. 
49. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) 
("There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality 
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitu-
tion, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when 
held to be embraced within the Fourteenth .... ").The Court also suggested that the 
presumption may be rebutted by showing that discrete and insular minorities are ad-
versely affected or that the political process is being impeded. See id. 
50. As Locke put the matter: 
But though this be a State of Liberty, yet it is not a State of License • •.• The Stale of 
Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges everyone: And Reason, 
which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all 
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, 
Liberty, or Possessions. 
]. LocKE, supra note I, at 288-89. 
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bly infringe upon the rightful domains of others.51 The com-
mon law of property, contracts, and torts defines the extent and 
nature of these boundaries.52 Tortious conduct is not a "right-
ful" exercise of one's liberty; likewise, one has no constitu-
tional right to commit trespass upon the land of another. 
Provided that one is acting rightfully in this sense, however, 
government must justify any interference with such conduct. 
Bork himself once flirted with the idea that the Constitution 
supports a "general principle of individual autonomy underly-
ing the particular guarantees of the Bill of Rights. " 53 Ulti-
mately, he came to reject the idea of an "independent right of 
freedom, which is to say a general constitutional right to be 
free oflegal coercion,"54 on the grounds that such a right is "a 
manifest impossibility in any imaginable society."55 If, how-
ever, this general right to liberty is considered not as absolute 
but rather as a justificatory presumption that shifts the burden 
to the government to show that interference with liberty is 
"necessary" and its motives "proper," then there is nothing re-
motely impossible about protecting such a right. Indeed, the 
allocation of such burdens of proof is a traditional function of 
the rule oflaw. 
In The Tempting of America, Bork considers and rejects a simi-
lar proposal advanced by Bernard Siegan.56 His first objection 
51. According to Locke, in the state of nature, "all Men may be restrained from 
invading others' Rights, and from doing hurt to one another." /d. at 288. 
52. The common-law process was not seen as the source of these rights-which are 
natural-but as the means of giving these otherwise abstract rights a conventionally 
established, specific content. See, e.g., id. at 368-69. While it is true that state legislation 
could systematize and even alter judge-made common-law rights, this was considered 
in large part to be an extraordinary corrective to the very strict common-law doctrine 
of precedent. Even so, most state and federal legislation does not even purport to be 
performing this corrective function. Moreover, the rules established by both common-
law decisions and legislation can be critically scrutinized to determine whether they are 
inconsistent with abstract natural rights. ' 
53. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1, 8 (1971) 
[hereinafter Bork, Neutral Principles]. See also Bork, The Supreme Court Needs a New Philoso-
phy, FORTUNE, Dec. 1968, at 138, 174 ("[I recommend] great lateral expansion of the 
area of individual rights. The new concept of rights becomes, indeed, something 
roughly describable as a presumption in favor of human autonomy."). 
54. Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 53, at 9. 
55. /d. 
56. See B. SIEGAN, EcoNOMIC LIBERTIES AND TIIE CoNSTITUTION (1980). Siegan pro-
poses the following standard of review: 
[T]he government would have the burden of persuading a court utilizing an 
intermediate standard of scrutiny, first, that the legislation serves important 
governmental objectives; second, that the restraint imposed by government is 
substantially related to achievement of these objectives, that is, . . . the fit 
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is the familiar one that the many liberties protected by such a 
presumption are "not mentioned in constitutional materials. "57 
As he puts it: "There being nothing in the Constitution about 
maximum hours laws, minimum wage laws, contraception, or 
abortion, the Court should have said simply that and left the 
legislative decision where it was."58 We have already seen, 
however, that Bork's argument for ignoring unenumerated 
rights depends upon the claim that the framers' failure to enu-
merate specific rights makes the judicial enforcement of rights 
not enumerated violative of the rule oflaw. If, however, there is 
a way of giving these provisions content that is consistent with 
the rule of law, then this objection must fail. 
Second, and more interestingly, Bork considers the pre-
sumptive nature of the right to liberty. Although he again re-
jects the concept on the grounds of feasibility, he no longer 
argues, as he once did, that such a right is an "impossibility in 
any imaginable society."59 Siegan cites Aaron Director's claim 
that "[l]aissez faire has never been more than a slogan in de-
fense of the proposition that every extension of state activity 
should be examined under a presumption of error."60 Bork re-
plies that the "next question, however, is who is to apply the 
presumption of error, players in the political process or judges. 
My answer is the former; Siegan's is the latter."61 
Bork defends his preference on the ground that the task fac-
ing a judiciary seeking to evaluate the necessity and propriety 
of governmental conduct would be "stupendous":62 
The court could not carry out the task assigned unless it had 
worked out a complete and coherent philosophy of the 
proper and improper ends of government with respect to all 
human activities and relationships. This philosophy must 
give answers to all questions social, economic, sexual, famil-
ial, political, moral, etc. It must be so detailed and well ar-
ticulated, with all major and minor premises constructed and 
put in place, that it enables judges to decide infinite numbers 
between means and ends must be close; and third, that a similar result cannot 
be obtained by less drastic means. 
Id. at 324. 
57. R. BoRK, supra note 20, at 225. 
58. /d. 
59. Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 53, at 9. 
60. B. SIEGAN, supra note 56, at 154 (citing Director, The Parity of the Economic Markel 
Place, 7 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 2 (1964)). 
61. R. BoRK, supra note 20, at 225. 
62. /d. at 226. 
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of concrete disputes .... No theory of the legitimate and 
important objectives of government that possesses all of 
these characteristics is even conceivable. No single philoso-
pher has accomplished it, and nine justices could not work it 
out and agree on it. Yet, upon the premise that a judge may 
not override democratic choice without an authorit~ other 
than his own will, each of these qualities is essential. 63 
633 
The problem with Bark's reply is revealed in his last sen-
tence, in which he assumes what a presumption of liberty calls 
into question-namely, that the legitimacy of democratic 
choice places the burden on the court to justify any interfer-
ence with legislative will when protecting unenumerated rights. 
He repeatedly asks how the court is "to demonstrate"64 or "to 
prove"65 that it is right and the legislature is wrong. However, 
we are speaking now of adjudication with parties on both sides 
of a case or controversy. In this context, placing the burden on 
"the court" is no different than placing the burden on the citi-
zen to justify his or her exercise of liberty. 
Although this position is entirely consistent with Bark's view 
that the "elected legislator or executive may act where not for-
bidden," it does no more than reassert the presumption of con-
stitutionality, rather than defend it. The presumption of liberty 
places the burden on the government to justify its interference 
with the liberties of the people. Therefore, the burden falls to 
the legislature or executive, not the court, to develop the theo-
ries to justify its actions. One need not be too cynical to suspect 
that, when the justificatory shoe is placed on the other foot, this 
burden will no longer remain so insurmountable. 
In his response to Siegan, Bork not only misses the basic 
thrust of the presumption ofliberty, he also misses the point of 
the theory of delegated powers that underlies the entire Con-
stitution and that is explicitly acknowledged in the Tenth 
Amendment. If the government cannot articulate a coherent 
and legitimate justification for its actions, if it cannot show how 
its actions are substantially related to these objectives and that 
it cannot achieve its objectives by means that do not infringe 
upon liberty,66 then it deserves to lose, and the citizen deserves 
63. /d. 
64. /d. at 227. 
65. /d. 
66. The text paraphrases the type of scrutiny recommended by Bernard Siegan. See 
supra note 56. 
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to win. According to the presumption of liberty, it is the legisla-
ture's burden to justify its conduct, not the citizen's or the 
court's.67 
Moreover, what Bork claims is an impossible function for 
judges is precisely how the First Amendment protection of 
speech is interpreted. Indeed, it is how Bork himself protected 
the freedom of speech as a federal appeals court judge. 68 
Courts have not interpreted the First Amendment to mean that 
government actions may never in any manner affect speech, but 
that when they do, the government is under a heavy burden to 
justify its conduct. This is a burden that the Executive and Leg-
islative Branches have sometimes met and sometimes failed to 
meet. The presumption of liberty simply extends the protec-
tion afforded to the enumerated right of free speech, and other 
enumerated rights, to the unenumerated freedoms retained by 
the people. 
One source ofBork's difficulty here is his acceptance of Her-
bert Wechsler's view oflegislation: "No legislature or executive 
is obligated by the nature of its function to support its choice of 
values by the type of reasoned explanation that ... is intrinsic 
to judicial action .... "69 In Bork's words, "no legislation rests 
on a principle that is capable of being applied generally."70 But 
a presumption of liberty contests this interpretive assump-
tion-an assumption that is, by the way, both extra-textual and 
questionable on originalist grounds. While the legislature may 
be under no general obligation to state a principled basis for its 
legislative acts, when these acts infringe upon the rightful liberties of 
the people and· are challenged, they must be defended in a princi-
67. Although the delegated powers provisions of the Constitution do not define the 
limits of state governmental powers, neither do state governments have plenary powers 
to do anything they will. Rather, when their actions infringe upon the unenumerated 
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, state government officials must show 
that they are properly exercising their so-called police powers. Any such justification 
requires a theory of this extra-textual doctrine of state powers that is not inconsistent 
with the textual protections afforded by the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. For 
one such theory, seeR. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI· 
NENT DOMAIN (1985). 
68. See Lebron v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 
1984). As Bork himself has argued: "We are ... forced to construct our own theory of 
the constitutional protection of speech. We cannot solve our problems simply by refer-
ence to the text or to its history. But we are not without materials for building." Bork, 
Neutral Principles, supra note 53, at 22-23. 
69. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional .Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15-16 
(1959). 
70. R. BoRK, supra note 20, at 80. 
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pled manner or be nullified as unlawful. It is not enough for a 
legislature to say, "We just wanted to do this." The legislature, 
no less than a court, must act lawfully. 
To see how a presumption ofliberty might operate, consider 
Congress's power under Article I, Section Eight to "establish 
post offices." Having exercised this power of establishment, 
Congress is free under the Necessary and Proper Clause to reg-
ulate the operation of its post offices in any manner it sees fit. 
But when Congress, allegedly pursuant to its postal powers, 
goes beyond its power to administer its own offices and claims 
the further power to establish a postal monop9ly, as it has, then 
it must be prepared to articulate a. compelling reaso~ ~hy such 
action is both necessary and proper, for presumptively it is not. 
In establishing the Constitution, the people retained the right 
to establish their own private post offices. 
Madison used the Ninth Amendment in a strikingly similar 
fashion during his speech to the House opposing the national 
bank bill. In challenging the constitutionality of the act, 
Madison examined the Constitution at length to see if the 
power to create such a bank could be found among any of 
those delegated to the government, and he concluded that "it 
was not possible to discover in [the Constitution] the power to 
incorporate a Bank. " 71 He then considered whether the pro-
posed bank might be justified under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause72 as a means of executing the Borrowing Power. 73 
"Whatever meaning this clause may have," he began, "none 
can be admitted, that would give unlimited discretion to Con-
gress. Its meaning must, according to the natural and obvious 
force of the terms and the context, be limited to means neces-
sary to the end, and incident to the nature of the specified 
powers."74 
71. 2 ANNALS OF CoNG., supra note 36, at 1896 (statement of Rep. Madison). 
72. See U.S. CoNST. an. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To make all Laws 
whi~. shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powe~s 
.... ). 
73. See id. ("The Congress shall have Power ... To borrow Money on the credit of 
the United States .... "). 
74. 2 ANNALS OF CoNe., supra note 36, at 1898. Madison's argument here reflects 
one of the reasons he offered for adopting a bill of rights: 
It is true, the powers of the General Government are circumscribed, they are 
directed to panicular objects; but even if Government keeps within those lim-
its, it has certain discretionary powers with respect to the means, which may 
admit of abuse to a certain extent, . . . because in the Constitution of the 
United States, there is a clause granting to Congress the power to make all 
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In evaluating the legitimacy of the lawmaking power, 
Madison contrasted the requirement of necessity with that of 
mere convenience or expediency. In so doing, he employed a 
type of scrutiny that is quite like the third step of the analysis 
urged by Bernard Siegan: 75 
But the proposed bank could not even be called necessary to 
the Government; at most it could be but convenient. Its uses 
to the Government could be supplied by keeping the taxes a 
little in advance; by loans from individuals; by the other 
Banks, over which the Government would have equal com-
mand; nay greater, as it might grant or refuse to these the 
privilege (a free and irrevocable gift to the proposed Bank) 
of using their notes in the Federal revenues. 76 
Notice that Madison was not simply making what would now 
be called a "policy" choice.77 Rather, he was advancing the 
constitutional argument that these other means of accomplish-
ing an enumerated objective or end are to be preferred in prin-
ciple precisely because they do not entail the violation of the 
rights retained by the people. In particular, these measures do 
not involve the grant of a monopoly, which, according to 
Madison, "affects the equal rights of every citizen. " 78 There is a 
difference in principle between these alternative means, just as 
there is a difference in principle, not merely in policy, between 
drafting citizens and paying volunteers as the means of exercis-
ing the congressional power to "raise and support Armies . 
,79 
Madison offered another reason against the theory that the 
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the pow-
ers vested in the Government of the United States, or in any department 
thereof. 
1 ANNALS OF CoNG., supra note 36, at 438 (statement of Rep. Madison). Madison con-
tended that a bill of rights was one way to police abuses of this discretion. 
75. See supra note 56. 
76. 2 ANNALS OF CoNG., supra note 36, at 1901 (statement of Rep. Madison). 
77. In his address to the House, Madison did address the policy issues raised by the 
proposal when he "began with a general review of the advantages and disadvantages of 
Banks." /d. at 1894. However, "[i]n making these rema~s on the merits of the bill, he 
had reserved to himself the right to deny the authority of Congress to pass it." /d. at 
1896. 
78. /d. at 1900. In this claim, Madison was in no way idiosyncratic. The eighth article 
of Roger Sherman's draft of the Bill of Rights stated: "Congress Shall not have power 
to grant any monopoly or exclusive advantages of commerce to any person or Com-
pany; nor to restrain the liberty of the Press." Sherman, supra note 48, at 352. Of the 
eight states that accompanied their ratification of the Constitution with proposed 
amendments, five (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and 
Rhode Island) offered similar language. See R. BARNE1T, supra note 18, at 353-85. 
79. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8. 
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Necessary and Proper Clause justified the bank-the fact that 
the power claimed was highly remote from any enumerated 
power: 
Mark the reasoning on which the validity of the bill depends! 
To borrow money is made the end, and the accumulation of 
capitals implied as the means. The accumulation of capitals 
is then the end, and a Bank implied as the means. The Bank 
is then the end, and a charter of incorporation, a monopoly, 
capital punishments, & c. implied as the means. 
If implications, thus remote and thus multiplied, can be 
linked together, a chain may be formed that will reach every 
object of legislation, every object within the whole compass 
of political economy. 
The latitude of interpretation required by the bill is con-
demned by the rule furnished by the Constitution itself.80 
As authority for this "rule" of interpretation, Madison offered 
the Ninth Amendment. His reference to the Ninth Amendment 
is reported in the Annals of Congress as follows: 
The explanatory amendments proposed by Congress 
themselves, at least, would be good authority with them; all 
these renunciations of power proceeded on a rule of con-
struction, excluding the latitude now contended for .... He 
read several of the articles proposed, remarking particularly 
on the lith [the Ninth Amendment] and 12th [the Tenth 
Amendment], the former, as guarding against a latitude of interpre-
tation; the latter, as excludin~ every source of power not 
within the Constitution itself. 81 
Thus, while Madison saw the Tenth Amendment as authority 
for the rule that the Congress could only exercise a delegated 
power, he saw the Ninth Amendment as authority for a rule 
against the loose construction of such powers-especially the 
Necessary and Proper Clause-when legislation affects the 
rights retained by the people.82 In Madison's view, for legisla-
80. 2 ANNALS OF CoNG., supra note 36, at 1899 (statement of Rep. Madison) (empha-
sis added). 
81. ld. at 1901. The numbering of the amendments changed because the first two 
amendments proposed by Congress were not ratified by the states. At the time 
Madison spoke, this outcome was not yet known. 
82. This is not the only time that Madison expressed his view that, though they may 
both share the objective of constraining the powers of government, the Ninth and 
Tenth Amendments do not operate identically. In his speech to the House explaining 
his proposed amendments, Madison referred to the precursor of the Tenth Amend-
ment in the following way: "Perhaps other words may define this more precisely than 
the whole of the instrument now does. I admit they may be deemed unnecessary; but 
there can be no harm in making such a declaration .... " 1 ANNALS OF CoNG., supra note 
36, at 441 (statement of Rep. Madison). Contrast this tone with the seriousness with 
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tion to fall under a delegated power it must be a genuinely nec-
essary and proper exercise of such a power. As he concluded: 
"In fine, if the power were in the Constitution, the immediate 
exercise of it cannot be essential; if not there, the exercise of it 
involves the guilt of usurpation. . . . "83 Put another way, as I 
have argued elsewhere, constitutional rights-including 
unenumerated rights-operate both as "means-constraints" 
and "ends-constraints. "84 
Recendy, Thomas McAffee has offered an insightful, de-
tailed, and closely-reasoned analysis of the original meaning of 
the Ninth Amendment. 85 An adequate treatment of his theory 
would require a more extensive consideration than is possible 
or appropriate in this discussion of the rule of law. Nonethe-
less, it is worth noting how Madison's application of the Ninth 
Amendment in his argument against the national bank under-
cuts McAffee's interpretation. 
McAffee denies that the rights retained by the people "are to 
be defined independently of, and may serve to limit the scope 
of, powers granted to the national government by the Constitu-
tion.''86 Instead, "the other rights retained by the people are 
defined residually from the powers granted to the national gov-
ernment."87 He contends that the Ninth Amendment was origi-
nally intended solely to prevent later intepreters of the 
Constitution from exploiting the incompleteness of the 
enumeration of rights to expand federal powers beyond those 
delegated by the Constitution. 88 He denies that it was intended 
to better protect individual rights by justifying a more strict con-
which he treated the precursor to Ninth Amendment. See text accompanying supra note 
43. 
83. 2 ANNALS OF CoNG., supra note 36, at 1902 (statement of Rep. Madison). 
84. See Barnett, supra note 30, at 11-16. 
85. McAffee, supra note 42. 
86. Id. at 1222. 
87. Id. at 1221 (emphasis added). 
88. As McAffee explains: "On the residual rights reading, the ninth amendment 
serves the unique function of safeguarding the system of enumerated powers against a 
particular threat arguably presented by the enumeration of limitations on national 
power." Id. at 1306-07. So, for example: 
If the government contended in a particular case that it held a general power 
to regulate the press as an appropriate inference from the first amendment restriction on 
that power, or argued that it possessed a general police power by virtue of the 
existence of the bill of rights, the ninth amendment would provide a direct 
refutation. 
Id. at 1307 (emphasis added). In sum, according to McAffee, the only function of the 
Ninth Amendment is to protect the scheme of delegated powers by arguing against this 
specific sort of inference. 
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struction of the enumerated powers than might be warranted 
under the delegated-powers provisions standing alone: 
The Ninth Amendment reads entirely as a "hold harmless" 
provision: it thus says nothing about how to construe the 
powers of Congress or how broadly to read the doctrine of 
implied powers; it indicates only that no inference about 
those powers should be drawn from the mere fact that rights 
are enumerated in the Bill of Rights. 89 
Yet when Madison used the Ninth Amendment in his speech 
concerning the national bank, he was in no manner responding 
to an argument for expanded federal powers based on the in-
complete enumeration of rights, but rather was arguing en-
tirely outside the only context in which, according to McAffee, 
the Ninth Amendment was meant to be relevant. Moreover, in 
contrast to McAffee's thesis, Madison used the Ninth Amend-
ment precisely and explicidy as authority for more stricdy con-
struing enumerated powers-in particular, the Necessary and 
Proper Clause. That is, Madison used the Ninth Amendment to 
restrict the means by which delegated powers can be exer-
cised-the "means-constraints" construction of the Ninth 
Amendment that I have defended elsewhere.9° Finally, contrary 
to what McAffee's theory would predict, Madison rested his ar-
gument against the claimed power to grant a monopoly charter 
in part on the fact that such a power violates the "equal rights 
of every citizen." 
In sum, rather than looking exclusively to the delegation of 
powers to define as well as to protect the rights of the people, 
as McAffee would have it, Madison looked to the rights re-
tained by the people in his effort to interpret and define the 
delegated-powers provisions.91 In Madison's words, the bill 
89. /d. at 1300 n.325 (emphasis added). 
90. See Barnett, supra note 30, at 11-16. There I defend the "power-constraint" con-
ception of constitutional rights in which rights constrain the exercise of constitutionally 
delegated powers. The alternative "rights-powers" conception views rights solely as 
what is left over after the powers have been delegated and thus "residual rights" (to 
employ McAffee's terminology) can and must be defined exclusively by reference to the 
enumerated powers. 
91. Although he does not discuss this use by Madison of the Ninth Amendment, 
McAffee is nothing if not resourceful in interpreting unfriendly evidence-as exempli-
fied by the lengths to which he goes to explain why Roger Sherman's reference to the 
"natural rights ... retained by [the people]" in his draft bill of rights has no bearing on 
the proper construction of the Ninth Amendment. See McAffee, supra note 42, at 1303 
n.333. I can imagine two responses that McAffee might make to my interpretation of 
Madison's speech concerning a national bank: 
First, because Madison did not specify the rights of the people that would be vio-
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"was condemned by the explanatory amendments proposed by 
the Congress themselves to the Constitution."92 
CoNcLusioN 
We may summarize the analysis presented here as follows. If 
the unenumerated rights retained by the people deserve judi-
cial protection, we require some means for protecting them 
that is consistent with the rule of law. The presumption of lib-
erty is one such means: It protects rights by providing a "rule" 
or, more accurately, a justificatory presumption that places the 
burden of justification upon the government whenever its ac-
tions infringe the rightful exercise of liberty by a person or as-
sociation. This presumption is at least as compatible with the 
lated, perhaps he was defining the infringement of these rights solely by the fact that 
the power claimed is beyond those delegated by the Constitution. According to this 
account, Madison was simply referring to the rights "reserved by" the delegation of 
powers and not to any "affirmative" rights retained by the people. But this response 
would have Madison engaged in a meaningless rhetorical flourish when making this 
part of his argument. Moreover, it does not explain Madison's consideration of the 
alternative means of exercising the borrowing powers. This construction would have 
Madison at this juncture making a policy argument in the guise of a constitutional 
claim, rather than, as I contend, to be making a principled distinction between means 
that violate the equal rights of the people, and those that do not. Nor does it explain 
Madison's use of the Ninth Amendment as authority for his conclusion that "if the 
power were in the Constitution, the immediate exercise of it cannot be essential." 2 
ANNALS OF CoNe., supra note 36, at 1902 (statement of Rep. Madison). According to my 
reading of the Ninth Amendment, one need not specify the rights retained by the peo· 
ple for these rights to do independent work in constraining the exercise of government 
powers. One need only shift the burden of justification to those advocating the legiti-
macy of the power. 
Second, McAffee may respond that Madison was not protecting "affirmative rights" 
at all but was simply using the Ninth Amendment to bolster the enumerated-powers 
scheme. Without question, the protection of the enumerated-powers structure of the 
Constitution was the main thrust of Madison's constitutional objection and was repeat-
edly mentioned by him. However, this answer would not save McAffee's thesis that a 
rights analysis is irrelevant to the construction of enumerated powers. According to 
McAffee, enumerated powers alone define rights; rights do not define powers. For this 
thesis to survive, it is not enough to argue that when the retained rights are being used 
to limit delegated powers, this is merely an expression of the limited-powers scheme. 
While preserving the form of McAffee's "reserved rights" thesis, this would reverse the 
interpretive methodology he favors. Instead of using the concept of delegated powers 
to define the concept of reserved rights, as he would have it, reserved rights would be 
used to help define the delegated powers. Thus, this response would support my view 
of the Ninth Amendment-one McAffee explicitly rejects, see McAffee, supra note 42, at 
1291-92-that the concept of constitutional rights, including unenumerated ones, pro-
vides a conceptual means in addition to the concept of delegated powers by which the 
legitimacy of claimed government powers can be critically assessed. In his speech con· 
cerning a national bank, Madison appears to have used the Ninth Amendment in just 
this way. 
92. 2 ANNALS OF CoNe., supra note 36, at 1902 (statement of Rep. Madison). 
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rule of law as the prevailing presumption of constitutionality, 
and perhaps more so. 
The presumption of constitutionality surrenders to the gov-
ernment the power to restrict any of the people's retained 
rights (unless prevented from doing so by the existence of an 
enumerated right). By providing no principled and effective 
procedural means to detect abuses in the exercise of govern-
ment power, this presumption fails to perform one of the prin-
cipal functions of the rule of law: the detection of enforcement 
abuse. After all, legislatures are but men and women, and if the 
"rule of men" is to be avoided, then legislative enactments 
must be scrutinized to determine whether they truly are "laws." 
In words that echo and apply to representative government the 
question john Locke asked of absolute monarchy,93 Madison 
observed: 
No man is allowed to be the judge in his own cause, be-
cause his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not 
improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay, with 
greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges 
and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most 
important acts of legislation but so many judicial determina-
tions, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, 
but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? And 
what are the different classes oflegislators but advocates and 
parties to the causes which they determine? ... Justice ought 
to hold the balance between them. 94 
The only agency available to put 'justice" or rights between 
the claims of the executive or legislature and that of the citizen 
is a court.95 By putting on those who infringe upon the liberties 
93. Here are Locke's words: 
I easily grant, that Civil Government is the proper Remedy for the Inconve-
niences of the State ofNature, which must certainly be Great, where Men may 
be judges in their own Case, since 'tis easily to be imagined, that he who was 
so unjust as to do his Brother an Injury, will scarce be so just as to condemn 
himself for it: But I shall desire those who make this Objection, to remember 
that Absolute MoTUlrchs are but Men, and if Government is to be the Remedy of 
those Evils, which necessarily follow from Mens being Judges in their own 
Cases, and the State of Nature is therefore not to be endured, I desire to know 
what kind of Government that is, and how much better it is than the State of 
Nature, where one Man commanding a multitude, has the Liberty to be judge 
in his own Case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases, without 
the least liberty to any one to question or controle those who Execute his 
Pleasure? 
J. LocKE, supra note l, at 294 (emphasis in original). 
94. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79-80 Q. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
95. True, at the time he wrote this passage, Madison did not appear to contemplate 
that judicial review could help deal with this problem. After the passage quoted in the 
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of the people the onus of explaining why their enactments are 
lawful-in the sense that they are justified on general princi-
ples-the presumption of liberty serves the rule of law far bet-
ter than the presumption of constitutionality. For we must 
never forget that the rule of law is meant to protect the people 
from the government, not to protect the government from the 
people. 
Beneath this debate about unenumerated rights and the rule 
of law lies another that concerns the source of constitutional 
legitimacy. Is the Constitution binding solely because it is the 
product of the exercise of will-in this case, the will of the peo-
ple who ratified it-as Robert Bork insists, or is it legitimate in 
whole or in part because it establishes a system of government 
that is substantively justified? The question of legitimacy is 
hardly a new one. As observed by Edward Corwin: 
The attribution of supremacy to the Constitution on the 
ground solely of its rootage in popular will represents ... a 
comparatively late outgrowth of American constitutional 
theory. Earlier the supremacy accorded to constitutions was 
ascribed less to their putative source than to their supposed 
content, to their embodiment of essential and unchanging 
justice .... The Ninth Amendment of the Constitution of 
the United States ... illustrates this theory perfectly, except 
that the principles of transcendental justice have been here 
translated into terms of personal and private rights. . . . 
[These rights] owe nothing to their recognition in the Con-
stitution-such recognition was necessary if the Constitution 
was to be regarded as complete. 
Thus the legality of the Constitution, its supremacy, and its 
claim to be worshipped, alike find common standing ground 
on the belief in a law superior to the will of human 
governors. 96 
Actually, it is the legitimacy of governmental action, rather 
than of the Constitution itself, that is directly at issue. The 
Constitution is binding, if at all, on the government and its offi-
text accompanying supra note 94, he continued: "Yet the parties are, and must be, them· 
selves the judges .... " /d. at 57 (emphasis added). After the ratification of the Constitu-
tion and under the influence of jefferson, however, he came to change his view. See B. 
SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND 118 (1977). In his speech introducing his 
proposed amendments to the House, he referred to "independent tribunals of justice 
[who] will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they 
will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Legislative 
or Executive. . . . " 1 ANNALS OF CoNe., supra note 36, at 439 (statement of Rep. 
Madison). 
96. Corwin, supra note 46, at 152-53 (emphasis in original). 
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cials. The question is whether actions of the government estab-
lished by the Constitution are binding "in conscience" on 
individuals and associations.97 Unless we have re~son to think 
that legislative or executive actions are consistent with the 
rights retained by the people, there is no prima facie moral 
duty to obey their dictates. 
When legislation is produced by constitutional processes that 
lack any impartial review to determine whether the legislation 
has this rights-respecting quality, then the people have no as-
surance of legitimacy. In the absence of such assurances, noth-
ing but force or power exists to enlist obedience. As Bork 
acknowledges: "Power alone is not sufficient to produce legiti-
mate authority."98 What he fails to see is that, without the scru-
tiny provided by a presumption of liberty, the fact that 
legislation is enacted suggests little, if anything, about its sub-
stantive legitimacy. Citizens have no reason to think it repre-
sents anything other than an exercise of naked legislative 
power-whether in service of a majority or a minority faction.99 
With the protection of the background rights retained by the 
people-both enumerated and unenumerated-providing the 
basis of constitutional legitimacy, the Borkian picture of the 
Constitution as "islands [of rights] surrounded by a sea of gov-
ernment powers"100 is reversed. In its place is the original pic-
ture of the Constitution, "wherein government powers are 
limited and specified and rendered as islands surrounded by a 
sea of individual rights."101 Ultimately, it is for us to decide 
which picture is correct. 
97. See Barnett, The Ninth Amendment and Constitutional Legitimacy, 64 Cm.-KENT L. 
REV. 37 (1988). . 
98. R. BoRK, supra note 20, at 176. 
99. See THE FEDERAUST No. 10, supra note 94, at 78 (emphasis added): 
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a major-
ity or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common 
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community. 
100. S. MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE CONSTITUTION 32 (rev. ed. 1987). 
101. ld. 
